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SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK:

SCIENCE AND ART?

Robert D. Leighninger, Jr.
Leslie H. Leighninger
Robert M. Pankin
State University of New York

Oswego

We live in an age of specialization and usually find it beneficial,
perhaps even essential. However, we have been aware since Marx's time
at least that the division of labor has its cost. And though we may be
a long way from the unconpartmentalized utopia where an individual
might do four different kinds of work in a single day, we cannot afford
to let the assumptions which underlie the separation of important
jobs and functions go without periodic reexamination. The separation
of the work of the sociologist (or, indeed, any social scientist) and
the social worker is one area where reconsideration is overdue. In
examining the taken-for-granted bases of this division of labor, we may
find they obscure more than they clarify.
One version of the conceptual basis for the distinction between
social work and sociology was offered by Robert Mclver in a series of
lectures at the New York School of Social Work (later Columbia School
of S.W.) in 1931. Mclver's lectures came at the end of a period of
widespread discussion of the relationships between sociology and social
work.
(Pankin, Leighninger, & Leighninger, 1973) This period, c. 19261932, was followed by a time of mutual indifference between the fields
and Mclver, having anticipated this development, was trying to keep the
possibility of collaboration alive by establishing a division of labor
while stressing interdependence.
It is impossible to tell, at least at
the moment, what influence Mclver's argument has had; we feel, however,
that his formulation is close enough to popularly held but seldom
articulated notions to merit our detailed attention. (e.g. Lubove, 1956,
P. 33; Kahn, 1959, P. 274; Chambers, 1967, P. 105)
"The relationship of sociology to social work," Mclver asserted,
"is that of a science to an art." (1931, p. 1)
An art manipulates, controls and changes...; a science
seeks only to understand....
An art individualizes, a
science generalizes. An art lives in concrete embodiments .... A science lives in abstract relationships ....
Each has its own task to perform, and while each needs
the other, neither can ever perform the task of the other.

(1931, p. 2)
The lecture, the first of a series of five, goes on to discuss this
relationship of sociology as science and social work as art and to make
many helpful suggestions on contributions each might make to the other.
Unfortunately, few of those suggestions seem to have found their way
into practice. Instead of focusing on the words "each needs the other,"
social workers and sociologists seem to have heard only: "each has
its own task."
The reasons for the failure of collaboration are numerous and will
take further work to give each its proper weight. The inability of
sociology to provide cookbook proceedures for dealing with specific
situations that could compete with Freudian prescriptions (Lubove, 1965,
pp. 64-114; Woodroofe, 1968, pp. 118-150), the continuing preference
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among social workers in particular and Americans in general for individual
8
rather than social explanations of social problems (Heraud, 1970, p. ;
Hinkle & Hinkle, 1954, p. 74), the politics of status and professionalization (Mclver, 1931, Pp. 18-19), and the politics of national public
policy all played a part in this separation. The conceptual distinction,
however, may be as important in keeping social work and sociology apart
as any of these other factors.
Mclver seems to base his art/science distinction on two broad
points: 1.) manipulation vs. understanding and 2.) generalization vs.
specificity. The first argument, that art (and social work) "manipulates,
controls and changes" while science (and sociology), stands apart and
"above", seeks only understanding, may be seen as a version of the classic
Weberiaa science/value or objective/subjective distinction. For Weber,
the relativity of values could be tolerated if the security of absolute
scientific truth was preserved. Mclver, who follows Weber on a number
of points, thus leaves it to the social worker to decide to what ends
"Social work must find its
the sociologist's knowledge will be put.
own standards of value.. .without aid and without hinderance from
science...." (1931 pp. 2-3)
The second point, that art "individualizes" and is concerned with
the concrete, the detailed, the particular while science seeks generalizations and "abstract relationships", is another traditional distinction
of Weber's time. It is most clearly formulated by Windleband but probably
should be traced to Plato's "divided line."
The implication is that the
social worker is immersed in the complex and concrete details of a
particular case and, moreover, must seek a practical resolution to the
problems presented. The sociologist, on the other hand, can afford
simply to observe and has the benefit of distance. He is concerned with
statements that are trans-situational. He establishes typologies, categories, and patterns.
He is responsible to an abstract ideal, "knowledge",
and not to particular clients.
Also implicit in the generalization/specificity argument is the
suggestion that the social worker's tactics in practice are a matter
of "native skill and acquired experience" (Mclver, 1931, p. 13) and have
only a tenuous relationship to scientific knowledge. Mary Richmond, in
her landmark social work text Social Diagnosis, expressed this more clearly
and in a manner truer to the art analogy:
...The practitioner of an art must discover the heart of the
matter himself -- it is of the essence of art that he shall
win his way to this personal revelation...
(1917, p. 103)
A recent version of this same distinction may be found in Jack Douglas'
title article in The Relevance of Sociology (1970, p. 187):
It is this concrete and particular, this immediate existence
full of uncertainty and contingency, which concerns us most
about man. And it is this realm of experience that we can
understand most fully only through poetic and artistic forms
of knowledge.
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Let us, then, take these two conceptual distinctions, derived from an
analogy of the relationship of art and science and being used to distinguish
social work from sociology, and examine each in detail.
When Weber promulgated the idea of value-free social science, he
was being pressed hard not only by German nationalism, which threatened
to turn university classrooms into jingoistic indoctrination sessions,
but also by German historicism, whose ever-growing mountain of historical
and cross-cultural data produced a doctrine of cultural relativity
which called into question all absolute standards of goodness, truth,
and beauty. Weber's strategy of yielding to cultural relativity in values
while holding to objective universality in science proved to be a very
successful holding action. This position, which lies behind Mclver's
manipulation vs. understanding distinction, is still maintained by
many American social scientists. Yet, an increasing number are beginning
to suspect that Weber really lost the battle with radical sociology of
knowledge. Having witnessed the uses of sociology by business and industry
for productivity and market research, having survived Vietnam and Project
Camelot, social scientists are more willing than before to agree that
"...the value-free doctrine of social science was sometimes used to
justify the sale of one's talents to the highest bidder...."
(Gouldner,
1962, p. 206; see also Birnbaum, 1971, pp. 214-231; Friedrichs, 1970, p.84)
Having seen a change in the physical sciences from Newtonian simplicity
to Einsteinian complexity and a corresponding change in philosophy of
science from positivist absolutism to the more conditional and pragmatist
viewpoints of Whitehead and Popper, having seen the arrival of the
sociology of knowledge to the physical sciences in the work of T.S. Kuhn,
many social scientists are ready to deal with the full impact of Mannheim's statement made in 1926:
At this point we may relativize ideas, not by denying them
one by one, not by calling them into doubt, not by showing
that they are reflections of this or that interest, but by
demonstrating that they are part of a system, or more radically,
of a totality of Weltanschauung, which as a whole is bound to,
and determined by, one stage of developing social reality.
From this point on, worlds confront worlds -- it is no longer
individual propositions pitted against individual propositions.
(Wolff, 1971, p. 69)
Both sociologists and social workers must now face the possible
interdependence of values and scientific knowledge. They both must cope
with the possibility that their value positions may affect their judgements of fact. They both must recognize the dependence of their theoretical
frameworks and methodologies on untestable assumptions about human
nature. They both must realize that they have responsibilities to people
in the form of agencies, foundations, industries, governments, and
clients of all sorts as well as to knowledge, and that these responsibilities
may dictate and limit both theories and actions. Finally, both must confront
the dependence of their thoughts and actions on macro-social and historical
factors that form the context of their work.
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Mclver's second basis of distinction, generalization vs. specificity,
has been much less challenged by recent scholarship than the first
argument; yet, we hope to show that it is equally troublesome. The
central problem, both with art and science and the analogical extension
to social work and sociology, is that this approach treats as an exclusive
Generalization
characteristic what is really a matter of relative emphasis.
and individualization or abstraction and concreteness are better seen
as points on a continuum than as dichotomous qualities. Both science
patterns and
and art rely on elements from both ends of the continuum:
generalizations at one end and unique details at the other.
The scientist, whose business it is to find, through properly
controlled variables, the patterns of reproducable events,
must distill these patterns from the unique. Generalizations
come from clinical studies, testable hypotheses from observation,
mathematical models and computer programs from a review of
intuitive findings. On the other hand, the artist and critic,
who wish most to produce a moment of unique feeling, both
In order for a work of
express themselves through patterns.
art to affect an audience, some common ground must exist. All
subject matter and media have some inherent pattern.

(Leighninger, 1971, p. 30)
It is true that scientists and artists have developed different
styles of communicating as well as different emphases on the continuum
of generalization/specificity. One must also note differing emphasis
on sensory or affective intensification and on the size of the audience
being addressed. However, none of these characteristics are sharp
enough to serve as boundary criteria separating art from science.
(Leighninger, 1972a) It might even be argued that the similarities are
more important than the differences.
The implications of this for Mclver's argument is that it may be
very misleading to think of social workers as dominated by the concrete
details of their specific case situations. Whatever a social worker does
in a particular situation will be influenced by basic assumptions about
man and society and by theoretical frameworks, partial or systematic,
overt or unreco(7nized. The fact that one has less chance of' controlling,
simplifying, or experimenting with the complex details of situations
may actually increase rather than decrease dependence on generalizations.

(Malinowski, 195h, p. 79ff)
the
This leans tc another dimension of Mclver's second argument:
make frequent
Mclver, Richmond, and Douglas all
concept of "experience."
reference to experience as a way of talking about an individual's
Douvlas 3tat
most clearLjy
encounter with :;pecil'icity and concreteness.
and in the extrerr wiut both Mclver , Richmond, anrd others :Arm to have
in mind:
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Any form of scientific analysis involves the imposition of
some form of presuppositions upon the "raw" experience of
everyday life.. .all analyses of human experience that go
beyond the practical considerations of goals and means
involved in an immediate situation do in fact wind up changing
everyday experience. At the least, they add to that experience
the conclusions for reflection which were not part of the
experience itself.
(1971, p. 187)
This picture has a certain attractive romanticism but does little to
help us understand everyday experience, much less the experience of
the artist or the social worker. It can be argued that everyday experience
is far from "raw" in the unorganized and unreflective sense that Douglas
seems to mean.
(for a review of physiological and psychological preconditions to perception presented for use in social work education see
Goldberg and Middleman, 1973; see also Blumer, 1969, pp. 1-60) The
presuppositions are already there in all likelihood and may even be
essential for experience itself. Only if the scientific presuppositions
are different from the folk presuppositions can experience be "changed".
Perhaps Douglas assumes that these presuppositions are always different.
In any case, the experience of artist and social worker, which we are
most concerned with here, cannot, it seems to us, be unreflective and
insensitive to larger issues and problems if effective art or casework
is to result.
Let us look again at the basis of the analogy:
the artist. A working
artist, particularly the ones we would regard as the "best," most
serious, most successful and enduring, can be observed to take considerable
pains with his product. It is the subject of deep reflection. If it
indeed deals with the specific, concrete details of everyday life and can
in fact help us understand "important realities" where science cannot
(Douglas, 1971, p. 187), it does so through careful organization,
thoughtful selection, and controlled stylistic technique. It may even
be considerable as a sociological theory itself.
(Leighninger, 1972b)
For detailed testimony to this by an artist one might consult Ben
Shahn's The Shape of Content. (1957) From the sociologist's point of
view, the theories of Mead, Dewey, and Kenneth Burke (discussed in this
context by Duncan, 1968) all stress the overlap of experience that the
artist must have with his audience in order to communicate and provide
the understanding valued by Mclver, Richmond, and Douglas.
One would
think that the successful social worker would likewise be one who is
diligent in using personal experience, empathy, and generalizations
(theory) to orchestrate a response adequate to the complexities of the
situation.
(Bruyn, 1966; Blumer, 1969; also c.f. the kind of sympathetic
introspection suggested by Mills, 1959, p. 196)
We hope that the conceptual distinction of sociologist and social
worker based on an art/science dichotomy may now be regarded with some
suspicion.
Let us continue with a brief discussion of developments in
sociological theory that further undermine an easy and clear division
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of labor and instead contribute to what some social workers would call
"role blurring". As we have said, McIver's discussion of separation
is based on Weber's separation of values and scientific knowledge. This
position has not only dominated American sociology but has also resulted
in the deemphasis of other Weberian doctrines on the process by which
sociological knowledge might be acquired. As the dominance of
Weberian value-free sociology ends, the Weberian stress on social
meanings and interpretative understanding may receive more attention.
A re-discovery of Marxist sociology and the sociology of knowledge
together with the emergence of ethnomethodology and the resurgence of
interactionist sociology (Sprietzer and Reynolds, 1973) provide other
spurs to a reconsideration of the business of acquiring sociological
knowledge and putting it to use. In this new discussion of the relation
of theory to practice, social work and sociology come closer together
than they have been in half a century.
Unlike the fact/value distinction which dominates mainstream
sociology, Weber's argument for the importance of understanding social
meanings has been taken seriously only by those on the margins of
sociology. Those sociologists most responsible for keeping alive the
tradition that the meaning that social acts have for the actors
themselves is a central datum for sociology and that the sociologist,
in order to adequately represent those meanings, should become an
active participant in the group he wishes to understand, are the
Symbolic Interactionists. They have their own version of Weber's argument
which derives from the social psychology and pragmatist epistemology
of George Herbert Mead. For Mead, "the structure of society lies in...
social habits, and only insofar as we can take these social habits into
ourselves can we become selves."
(Strauss, 1964, p. 33) Individual action
...is a construction and not a release, being built up by
the individual through noting and interpreting features of
the situations in which he acts...[and] group or collective
action consists of the aligning of individual actions, brought
about by the individual's interpreting or taking into
account each other's actions. (Blumer in Manis & Meltzer,
1972, p. 148)
In order to study society, according to the interactionist, it is
necessary to "...catch the process of interpretation..." through which

social action is structured. "To catch the process, the student must
take the role of the acting unit whose behavior he is studying."
(Blumer in Manis & Meltzer, 1972, p. 151)
Another development in sociological theory, ethnomethodology,
which is in part an outgrowth of the interactionist tradition incorporating
elements of European phenomenology, places even more emphasis on the
everyday meanings of social acts. Participant observation, a standard
research method of the interactionists, has become even more flexible
under the influence of phenomenology, which places stress on the
intuitive benefits of participation. (Bruyn in Filstead, 1970)
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The rediscovery of Marxist sociology has been another impetus to the
reexamination of questions on how sociological knowledge is acquired
as well as to what uses it is put. Marxists urge a more direct
relationship of theory to practice, a dialectical relationship
requiring constant interaction. Marx t s eighth "thesis on Feuerbach"
states:
All social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries
which urge theory into mysticism find their rational solution
in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

(1947, p. 199)
Although the activist imperative of most Marxist sociologists is not
shared by most ethnomethodologists and many interactionists, all seem
inclined to agree that more direct involvement by the sociologist in
the substance of his inquiry is essential for adequate sociological
knowledge.
Involvement is not only a source of strategic information
for the student of social processes, but it may also be seen as the
only way to interpret the findings of other, more traditional methods.
Survey research, laboratory experiments, demographic data all may require
comparison with data from "natural observation" and experiments in
"natural settings". As Jack Douglas has concluded, summarizing all
these
trends:
...as our conceptions of society change, our conceptions of
the nature of(scientific) sociological knowledge will also
change. We shall come to see sociological knowledge and all
scientific knowledge, as necessarily grounded in our personal
involvement in common sense practical activities, we shall become convinced that the real question is not whether but how
we should be involved.
(1970, p. 210)
(Despite the criticisms leveled above at one small part of Douglas'
discussion, the piece as a whole admirably covers many complex issues;
and much of our argument is indebted to his clear and comprehensive
presentation.)
Though we are probably not likely to see the distinction between
sociology and social work disappear under the converging trends of
sociological theory combining involvement with reflection and practice
with theory, we may at least imagine a period where transit between the
two different activities will be easier. Moreover, as pressures for
vocational training threaten to lead to greater curricular specialization,
it cannot hurt to think occasionally of the things that social worker
(or any practitioner) and sociologist (or any social scientist) have in
common:

1.

They both need to confront the influence of values on their theories
and actions;
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2.

they both must recognize the influence of patrons (people who pay
them) on what they do, and

3.

deal with possible conflicts between those interests and the interests
of those they would like to help;

4. they both theorize, developing general explanations for the things
they encounter and general strategies for getting more information;
5.

they both practice, test, or act in the complexity and concreteness
of social reality.

If a focus on common or shared traits seems to obscure important
facts, one must remember what is obscured in the focus on separation. It
hides from the social scientist his reliance on values and practical
involvement and his possible dependence on patronage. It shields from the
social worker his reliance on theoretical frameworks, his responsibility
to think beyond particular situations and cases and to help create new
knowledge. If a political scientist can move from wholehearted involvement in getting someone elected to a critical analysis of the whole
political system, why can't sociologists and social workers switch
jobs now and then? This has its practical and conceptual perils, but
it might lead to a more realistic and effective performance by both.
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